TERRORISTS ACTION IN SUKMA DISTT,JHARKHAND :CAPF MUST INTROSPECT

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE ?

NEED FOR A  DEEP INTROSPECTION

Why are we losing precious lives of uniformed men in Chattisgarh time & again? 

Time has now come to look into the problem areas squarely & carry out a deep & honest introspection. This is an attempt to appraise critically as to where does the faults lie. These views are entirely personal, unbiased & have no prejudice towards any one. Nor there is an intent to cast aspersions or letting down any Armed Police Force or any individual connected with these. It is a matter of National concern that there has been a spate in such unfortunate incidents recently. Apparently, we do not seem to have learnt lessons from these mishaps to take corrective measures. There is just no point in running away from the truth. We must pin point the reasons behind such avoidable lapses & take corrective measures.

Excluding two Special  Action Groups of the National Security Guard- that comprise of hundred percent Army All Ranks on deputation, the remaining personnel of the CAPF earlier known as Central Police Organization(CPO) are the largest such variety & mix  of Armed Police Force available to any single country  in the entire world. Each Armed Police Force was raised as & when their requirements were felt by the Home Ministry.

In absence of any holistic National Security Policy, these have become tools in the hands of the MHA. Consequently, these lack the much needed leadership, motivation & professionalism. It is a sad spectacle to see these Armed Police Forces to handle various terrorists’ related situations in a lackasadical manner. Their leadership does not identify themselves fully with the men on ground-the cutting edge. This leads to frittering & poor management of resources coupled with a wide gap in inter- personal relationship .As a result, these Police Forces remain mostly directionless.

Above notwithstanding, there have been examples of raw courage displayed by these Armed Police Forces personnel.These, however, remain as exceptions when compared to their strength , magnitude & potential- if tapped to its maximum. It would not be out of context here to mention that in most of the advanced countries of the world, terrorist related operations are carried out solely by respective Police Forces in a highly professional manner. 

Armed Forces are not meant to be employed for such operations. It would, therefore, not be incorrect to state that full cogency & dynamism of the CAPF is not being made use of. Where does the fault lie?

There is little ‘Group Dynamics’ in Ranks & File since these Police Forces work as mathematical entities. More often than not, the requirement/deployment is measured & spelt out in number of companies. This is not directly related to the tasks ‘per se’ ,but generally denotes the visible presence of Khaki Personnel wielding weapons as a deterrent force in the area of interest for a defined period of time .Will these personnel be able to shoot straight when required or how often they practice firing at the Ranges, is yet another important issue!

The IPS officers very seldom command these battalions. Mostly, they are posted in appointments of DIGs  & upwards. Because of dissatisfaction in Cadre Officers, a few higher appointments have now come in their kitties. Surprisingly, in the functioning of CAPF, the Operations Directorate holds lower priority than Administrative Directorate. IPS Officers mostly hold administrative posts & have huge financial powers. This separation  is instrumental in generating a total mismatch between the IPS & Cadre Officers;the latter are deployed on ground/field duties. These duties at Company or equivalent levels are led by Cadre officers assisted by Inspectors /Sub Inspectors.

The Director Generals of the CAPF are located in New Delhi .The Badges of Rank of CAPF  resemble  those of Indian Army, so much so, that the combat uniforms are also very much similar . CAPF has introduced more or less similar customs & traditions including dress patterns from the Army. The CAPF & their Officers Cadre remain in very close touch with the MHA, unlike Armed Forces do with the MOD. This subservience to their Masters in the Home Ministry has ,perhaps,affected their self esteem & professionalism to a great extent. 

Thus, their focus in providing good leadership & hard professional training to their men has taken a backward step. It is good & impressive to see tall , well built & smart CAPF personnel in Bright colours marching on the Raj Path, showing eyes to their counterparts at the Attari Border– both performing awkward drill movements, performing stunts  on Motor Cycles , playing the Brass Band on camel backs,etc, but these activities are perfunctory  & superficial.At best these can be termed as ceremonial show offs. These have nothing to do with their primary responsibilities.

 I understand that every CAPF has created its own Commando Element. These have been given impressive names as well. All these are OK, but for God’s   sake, do not compromise on your basic & primary tasks, leadership & training angles. 

Failure to do so amounts to offering  Armed Police men as ‘cannon fodder’ to waiting terrorists.Strength of any Armed Police Force does not lie on the numerical superiority or their flashing dresses/accouterments. It lies primarily on their sharpened teeth accrued as a result  of dynamic ‘leadership & training combo’-the ultimate winning factor. 

What is the point of having about 8000 men in the NSG & yet calling it as a Special Force? Let us not forget that SAS, DELTA FORCE, GSG-9 & the like have a very small strength. They are ‘die-hard professionals’, who work on the ethos -“FORTUNA FAVET FORTIBUS”- meaning Fortune Favours the Bold.

Coming to the tragic incident that has occurred, all sorts of reporting in the print/electronic media is being flashed with astonishing regularity. Exact details are either not known or given. Nor, these shall ever be known to the public. Truth is always the first casualty in such mess ups. Everyone is covering their back & blaming some one or the other for the catastrophe. Surprisingly, the press coverage has also  waned out  since Polls are more important, & so are the weird statements & antics of the Netas & their cronies !

From the press reports given out so far, it is still not very clear whether it was a Convoy, or a Protection Party mounted on vehicles as a Roving Patrol. The fact of the matter is that neither any actionable intelligence was available to the Leader & his men nor the road was cleared & secured prior to move of these vehicles. 

Road Clearance, in itself, is an onerous & absorbing operation, wherein, the stretch of the subject road is physically checked minutely for any sabotage, & in all its manifestation. Mine detectors are employed along with these parties. Bridges & Culverts are checked in details. Sniffer & Patrol Dogs are pressed in service. While this exercise is going on by the Composite Task Force, both flanks of the stretch of the subject road are physically combed to ensure that no terrorists are hiding nearby. The distances from the road to either flanks has to be beyond the effective range of small arms. These searches continue simultaneously under constant supervision of respective Party Commanders. Commander of the Road Opening Party keeps in constant touch with these elements. In fact, reliable signal communications within & to the Base form the life line of such laborious operation.

Having satisfied with the search on the road & on either flanks & getting ‘all clear’, the Road Opening Party Commander issues further instructions to move ahead. Small detachments that are self supporting & self contained are left on ground to ensure that no terrorist gets an access inside the sanitized areas.

The entire road clearing process is painfully slow & demands a very high degree of tactical expertise, precision  & junior leadership. It is only after the clearance is given by the Commander of the Road Clearance Party to his higher ups that the Central Control permits move of foot/vehicular columns on the road. 

As I compare the recent incident with similar incidents that have happened in the past, I find that a certain amount of complacency has set in. The CAPF Sector/Battalion/Company Commanders must adhere in 'letter & spirit' to basic ‘Section Leading & Platoon Tactics’. Obviously, no heed was paid to minor tactics in the typical attitude of ‘Chalta Hai’. The end result is loss of precious lives. 

All sorts of political statements are being given. A number of Courts/Boards of Inquiry have been ordered. All sorts of Press Releases are being given from the concerned CAPF Headquarters in CGO Complex, New Delhi & Headquarters of State Police Force of State Capital. What is unfortunate, is that there is little liaison & coordination between the CAPF & State Police Departments. 

Again CAPF shall talk of poor weapon systems & equipment to tackle such situations. The game shall go on! It is the men that matter, provided personal examples are given by their Leaders. When shall that day come when a genuine desire & attempt by the CAPF to improve their leadership & training  takes a concrete shape?

The CAPF have to get out of their “Policia Culture” at the earliest. Hundreds of Crores of Public Exchequers money is spent on their up keep. They are answerable to the people. It is high time that the Home Ministry & the Director Generals of the CAPF introspect, face the truth, identify the problem areas & take remedial measures on war footing. 

Increasing desertions, seeking premature retirements & increased cases of fratricides are pointers to failure of Command & Control & Higher Directions.

In the larger interests of Nation Building & Integration-let us not give alibis or pretences for our lapses. Let the Heads roll if need be!

Enough is enough!